




































Supply-Side Peacekeeping: Theories 




















▪ Birkbeck, University of London ▪ Malet Street ▪ London ▪ WC1E 7HX ▪ 
Supply-Side Peacekeeping: Theories and New
Evidence from a Panel Data Analysis
Vincenzo Bove∗
Birkbeck College, London †
Leandro Elia
Università della Calabria ‡
January, 2010
Abstract
Why do nations with heterogeneous economies, geographic positions and institu-
tions agree to dispatch their troops to remote conﬂict areas? This paper explores the
domestic and international determinants of countries' contribution to peacekeeping
operations from 1999 to 2009. Individual nations make their decision about where,
when and how to send their military personnel as well as the justiﬁcations on which
they base their involvement in sovereign states. Moral imperative for peacekeeping
may be universally accepted but a country decision to participate is also based on
self-interest combined to the geo-strategic dimension and ﬁnally constrained by po-
litical and technical considerations. Empirical results suggest that at the domestic
level technical forces, such as the sustainability of multiple missions and military
capabilities, all play a role. At the international level peacekeeping contributions
are driven by the security threat that a conﬂict poses and the number of displaced
people.
Keywords: Peacekeeping, Panel Data, Voluntary contributions
JEL Classiﬁcation : C33, D74, H56
1 Introduction
Peacekeeping operations and crisis management missions are building blocks of global
security as never before. In the Cold War era superpower rivalries limited the scope for
international responses to regional conﬂict. However, after the Soviet Union collapsed,
in the 1990s, crises in the Balkans, Somalia, Cambodia and elsewhere saw a widespread
practice of external intervention with the aim of building "`sustainable peace"'. The
UN alone experienced an eight-fold increase in the frequency with which it launched
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new operations, an average of one new mission every six months. In the light of this
impressive rise, regional organizations, ad-hoc coalitions of states and individual countries
have taken on larger peacekeeping responsibilities in conﬂicts around the globe. Peace
operations are important, they can contribute to the maintenance of regional peace and
stability; reduce the likelihood of unwelcome interventions by regional powers; promote
the economic stability and manage the refugee problem. The record of UN peacekeeping
operations is well-known, with some impressive failures of the early and mid 1990s, in
Angola, Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, but also some striking success, following the end
of civil wars in Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique and East Timor. Understanding the
conditions associated with peace operation success (the life with third party forces against
life without them) has been the focus of most scholars of peace operations. However
there are three dimensions to peacekeeping; demands, the situation that invite foreign
military intervention; supply, the forces behind countries' voluntary contribution to peace
operations; and the success of the operation, which is determined by the nature of the
interaction. The high demand for multilateral military forces in Africa and the Middle
East ensures that the supply of uniformed personnel is a recurrent, urgent and intensifying
challenge for the international community. Understanding the willingness of third party
states to provide peacekeeping is important to explain the uneven record of achievements
and to coordinate an eﬀective response.
Bringing sustainable peace by means of external power is an ambitious commitment
which requires a high level of involvement. Worldwide demand for missions is still growing
at a fast pace, however the supply-side of peace operations has come under incredibly
diﬃcult strains. The demand for troops continues to outstrip supply, although the gap
between these two dimensions of peacekeeping is diﬃcult to quantify. In the last few
years the surge of violence in many parts of the world saw many already over stretched
operations, close to collapse on the ground.
In many instances, ill-equipped and weakly empowered peacekeepers have to police
large territories and in countries like Congo, Chad, Sudan, overstretch remains a serious
problem. Given the sheer size of the countries, the large number of troops deployed
remains insuﬃcient. In DRC, for example, the UN deploys 16,500 troops in a country of
2,345,410 square kilometres, a ratio of one soldier for every 100 square kilometres. It is
not only a question of willingness to provide peacekeepers or political weakness to launch
new operations. Inadequate economic resources in a global ﬁnancial crisis is another
worrying factor. Indeed, there has been a slowing down of overall deployment in the last
few years: over the decade that followed the end of the Cold War there was an average
annual increase of 15-20 %. In 2008 the number of troops deployed rose by 8.7%, only
because of a 20% increase in NATO deployment in Afghanistan. However, ﬁgures are often
misleading and except for ISAF, the developed world contribution seems to be declining.
One thing about UN peacekeeping thta is certainly true is that it relies overwhelming on
the troops of developing economies. Data from SIPRI shows that since 2003 developing
countries peacekeeping through the UN has exceeded all others forms of peacekeeping and
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it is the only activity showing a steady upwards increase. Moreover, among developing
economies, those who were former host countries, are now the new contributors, as is the
case with Jordan, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Baltic States. Many scholars try to understand
why, if the international community as a whole is so committed to peace, the poorest
countries are the ones for the most part supporting this objective. We think that looking
only at developing countries' contribution still leaves a highly heterogeneous group: sub-
Saharan Africa, semi-industrialized South America, the oil-rich Middle East, the emerging
economies and population giants of China and India. Bellamy and Williams (2009) claim
that Western countries' peacekeeping eﬀort is conducted through hybrid operations,
where troops work in tandem with the UN forces but outside UN command . They
suggest that Western peacekeeping is not declining, it has just evolved in complexity.
Peacekeeping is the most common type of action by armed force today, a purposeful
dispatch of national troops into another sovereign country, and can be identiﬁed as a
subset of military intervention. A good deﬁnition of military intervention is provided by
Pickering and Kisangani (2009), as the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne,
seaborne, shelling, etc.) of one country inside another, in the context of some political
issue or dispute. Methodological issues arise when we try to determine which foreign
deployments of troops should be counted as peacekeeping. The operational criteria that
is most commonly used, e.g. by SIPRI, is that the operation is conducted either under
the authority of the UN or by regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions of states that
were sanctioned by the UN or authorized by a UN Security Council resolution, with the
stated intention to: (a) serve as an instrument to facilitate the implementation of peace
agreements already in place, (b) support a peace process, or (c) assist conﬂict prevention
and/or peace-building eﬀorts. However in some cases the stated goal may be just a
rhetoric of the intervention and may not reﬂect the real motivations of the intervener.
In fact the largest foreign troop deployments are carried out by the US, the bulk of
which are not associated with UN missions, but could be justiﬁed by the US as fulﬁlling
peacekeeping missions. Fig 1 and 2 contrast the number of US troops in foreign countries
with the number of UN troops in peace operations. The diﬀerence is striking. The scales
do not overlap, US troops in foreign countries today are more than 400.000, ﬁve times
the maximum number of troops deployed by UN.
Notwithstanding the disagreement about how to categorize diﬀerent operations and
diﬀerent contributors, there is certainly a need for greater Western involvement in mul-
tilateral peace operations; only developed countries can provide specialized personnel,
logistical support and specialized vehicles (e.g. Armoured Personnel Carrier, helicopters,
tanks). Many missions also require airlift, engineers to provide roads and bridges and
sometimes satellite imaging and secure communication.
The precise degree of participation is the subject of intense debate at the international
community and domestic level. Although the literature on peacekeeping is large, few
studies deal with the participation dilemma. Why have so many states agreed to supply
troops in peacekeeping operations in the second decade after the end of the Cold War?
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Figure 1: Number of US Troops in Foreign Countries. Source: US Department of Defence
and The Heritage Foundation
Figure 2: Total size of UN Peacekeeping Forces. Source: Peace and Security Section of the
UN Department of Public Information and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
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Is peacekeeping just a self-interested action to preserve or increase a country's standing
and power in the world? Understanding why and where countries strategically decide to
intervene is central to evaluating the success of past operations.
We brieﬂy review the empirical literature on the set of motivations at work behind
peacekeeping participation. We identify the few studies that address empirically the
problem of troops' provision. We also evaluate a range of reasons that have been sug-
gested by a number of scholars as explaining peacekeeping contribution. We examine
the main theoretical arguments on military intervention, to develop strong testable hy-
potheses. While there is an unquestionable set of non-testable aspects of beneﬁts that
result from troop contribution, there are also testable ﬁnancial and security advantages
of intervention. Subsequently, we investigate the extent to which peacekeeping voluntary
contribution can be explained by standard economic models. Next we present a panel
analysis of individual countries personnel contributions to peace operation in the period
1999-2009. This is followed by a discussion of the econometric issues involved in the anal-
ysis of panel data and a presentation of the methods used in the empirical analysis. Panel
data methods allow both the cross-sectional and the time-series dynamics to be taken into
account. We test a set of hypotheses that can be grouped according to a three dimen-
sions: conﬂict and operation characteristics, participant technical capabilities and target
region economic salience in terms of trade openness and investment in the target region.
A good number of motivations is also explained by the diversiﬁcation of peacekeeping
contributors. Therefore we attempt a broader comparison of UN peacekeeping against
other regional organizations to provide a better understanding of participation dynamics.
Then we will discuss the inferences we might draw from the empirical investigation.
2 Literature review
Surprisingly there is a modest understanding about how countries decide to intervene in
UN operations. Compared to the extensive literature on conﬂict resolution, the research
on the provision of military personnel in multilateral peace operations is poor. We can
separate the literature on the basis of the methodology applied; case studies, descriptive
statistics and empirical research.
The bulk of studies is on the motivations behind particular countries' participation,
made on a case-by-case basis. This approach uses an intensive investigation of a particular
operation to obtain a rigorous account of peacekeeping motivations. However, case studies
suggest a degree of caution, because there are always many obstacles when it comes to the
in-depth exploration of a particular country's policy. Indeed, this would require a deep
understanding of the relationships between various state apparatus and institutions, and
an intensive historical investigation of foreign policy decisions. Generalizing on the base
of case-studies is dangerous for two reasons; what may account for contribution in one
country may contradict the conclusion for another country and the more country-speciﬁc
the case-study, the more diﬃcult is to draw general conclusions.
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Descriptive statistics draw general conclusions without the need to rely on detailed
case studies. In this category, one of the most comprehensive studies, that by Bobrow and
Boyer (1997), focuses on the troop and ﬁnancial support for PKOs. They claim that the
post-Cold War period has seen a rise in the diversity of contributors and beneﬁciaries. The
changing set of states suggests a diverse set of motivations. The majority of studies are a
descriptive analysis of whether the wealth of states has conditioned contributions to UN
operations. Diﬀerences between types of governance and levels of income, development
and involvement in international organizations are also presented as explanations for the
disparities between states' contributions to UN missions. Daniel and Caraher (2006) ﬁnds
that in the period 2001-04 the bulk of contributors is constituted by democratic, rich and
middle income, stable and highly and lesser developed states. However, the qualitative
nature of some country-speciﬁc beneﬁts has prevented any empirical analysis.
The applied literature on the determinants of peacekeeping contribution is diverse.
The quantitative studies draw a number of empirical generalizations and can be further
divided into three broad groups according to the question they attempt to address. The
ﬁrst group analyses the reasons behind military interventions by external powers. The
second branch focuses on the factors that make UN intervention more or less likely. The
third group analyses exclusively the peacekeeping ﬁnancial burden sharing.
The ﬁrst branch tends to exclude multilateral interventions from its analysis. One
of the earliest attempts is Mitchell (1970) who identiﬁes four factors behind military
interventions: 1) the characteristics of the country in conﬂict; 2) the characteristics of
the intervener; 3) the character of the international system; and 4) the linkage patterns
between the groups in the target and intervener. This last argument is consistent with
Carment and James (1995) ﬁndings. They argue that the decision to intervene is heav-
ily inﬂuenced by the ethnic aﬃnities between the potential intervener and the target.
Pearson (1974) identiﬁes both aﬀective and instrumental reasons behind foreign military
interventions such as territorial acquisition; protection of social groups in the target; safe-
guard of diplomatic interests; ideology and regional power balances. Regan (1998) uses
the characteristics of the conﬂict to identify which types of conﬂicts attract outside in-
tervention. He claims that intense conﬂicts are unlikely to attract outside actors, while
those that involve humanitarian crises are quite likely to do so. He also ﬁnds that the
number of shared borders have a counter-intuitive eﬀect, the greater the number, the less
likely the intervention.
Through all of this research, we do not have a set of strong logically consistent and
empirically veriﬁed conditions that make a foreign military intervention in intrastate
conﬂicts more likely. Moreover, the focus has only been on the selection process that
determines which conﬂicts attract interventions. However, the conﬂict typology alone
cannot explain the spread of intervention proﬁles and the decision about participation.
We complement this limited literature with the inclusion of the conﬂict's characteristics
together with the speciﬁc providers' features, taking into account both domestic and
international considerations. Nonetheless, we are wary of the fact that the comparison
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between unilateral and multilateral intervention is not straightforward. In unilateral
interventions the nature of the decision faced by the policy-makers and the costs and
beneﬁts derived by the participation are diﬀerent from those associated with multilateral
interventions.
Second, there are those studies focusing on UN intervention [e.g. Doyle and Sambanis
(2000); Beardsley (2004)], and assuming that UN is a rational unitary actor in the inter-
national system with his own set of preferences. However, UN is not a state in its own
right and both its capabilities and their deployment come from its member states. Any
individual state in the international community has its own preferences, there are collec-
tive action problems and what is individually rational for a state might not be collectively
rational for the UN. The reasons must be found in the capitals of provider-states, not in
New York. Although the international system has properties and dynamics of its own,
the participation to peacekeeping is reducible to the level of individual state behaviour.
Together, member states' domestic factors, shaped by the international system, determine
the UN capacity for action.
The third group analyses exclusively the peacekeeping ﬁnancial burden sharing, to
grasp the ratio of excludable to public beneﬁts generated by peace operations. These
empirical studies have found mixed results. With the so-called exploitation hypothesis,
Olson Jr and Zeckhauser (1966) claim that large countries accept a disproportionate share
of the peacekeeping burden, because they have the greatest part of beneﬁts from peace and
stability. However, Khanna et al. (1999) found no statistical evidence of a positive cor-
relation between UN peacekeeping actual payments and countries' GDP for 29 countries
(mainly NATO members) from 1976 to 1999. Their ﬁndings indicate no disproportionate
burden sharing and a degree of commitment to international security. Instead, Shimizu
and Sandler (2002) found statistical evidence that burden-sharing is disproportionate dur-
ing the post-Cold War period (1994-2000), indicating that peacekeeping has a relatively
large share of purely public beneﬁts, which leads to some exploitation by the small. More
recently, Gaibulloev et al. (2009) suggest that during 1994-2006 non-UN peacekeeping was
driven by self-interest in the form of participant-speciﬁc beneﬁts, while UN peacekeeping
depended on the contribution of others, therefore displaying global public beneﬁts.
We think that the ability to provide troops and pay the human costs makes the
decision criteria somewhat diﬀerent from those associated with a ﬁnancial contribution.
Financial arrangements do not have to consider the many factors at play in the decision
to supply troops such as the risk of casualties or the stress on the military. National oﬀers
to provide personnel are subject to their overall national capacity, taking into account
force size, prior and concurrent commitments, and logistical capabilities. Every troop
contribution, every big or small, has an impact on the success of the operation. Therefore,
unlike the monetary contributions, the quality of the "`product" provided is relevant.
A country may volunteer to send only infantry personnel, others may send armoured
reconnaissance elements, artillery batteries or service support personnel. Many troop-
contributing countries commit also the equipment necessary to support their personnel.
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Therefore, the decision to dispatch soldiers, and the "`force generation", follow a diﬀerent
procedure and implies a diﬀerent decision making process.
3 Why states choose to intervene
The collective responsibility for international security and the compliance to the UN
norm of collective security provision would entail that all states, when capable of provid-
ing troops to peace missions, will do so, if needed. However, being able to deploy military
forces does not always translate into having or choosing to do so. National militaries have
been traditionally conceptualized as defenders of the homeland from outside invasions or
to initiate a war of aggression to conquer territory, resources and thus power. This also
means that often military operations were localized around the national borders. The
end of the Cold War has introduced the idea of policing independent states' territory or
protecting their governments' stability. Partly as a consequence of this new idea, in many
states started a process of re-directing their armed forces from a focus on self-defence to
the projection of troops beyond the national territory, principally in multilateral peace
operations. 1 Individual nations make their decision about where, when and how to send
their military personnel as well as the justiﬁcations on which they base their involvement
in sovereign states. Moral imperative for peacekeeping may be universally accepted but a
country decision to participate is also based on self-interest combined to the geo-strategic
dimension and ﬁnally constrained by domestic and technical considerations. Peacekeeping
diverts ﬁnancial national resources from domestic to international priorities, reducing at
the same time the number of troops available to assist the national governments. The de-
sire to make peace is thus intertwined with other motives. We ﬁnd helpful to diﬀerentiate
among motives concerning the domestic political features of the intervener, decisions re-
lated to technical considerations and reasons linked to the international system, therefore
to the nature of the conﬂict and the region at stake.
3.1 Domestic component
We can identify several domestic dynamics associated with deciding to intervene: the
public pressure; the tolerance of casualties; the procedural obstacles; and simple politi-
cal considerations. To a certain extent there might be a purely humanitarian altruistic
motivation; the principle that something must be done to stop the killing and human suf-
fering associated with civil wars. Such an approach is particularly manifested when public
opinion and media pressure urge national governments to intervene. Public demands for
action are reactive; they arise after widespread media coverage of human rights violations
has raised public awareness. Intervention in this case helps to protect a government from
1Quoting Kennedy (2006), four hundreds years ago Swedish, Danish, Italian and French soldiers
hacked and burned their way all over Europe.; during the past ﬁfty years they instead have been sending
peacekeeping contingents everywhere from the Congo to the Middle East. Western participation is seen
as a shift from national egoism to a higher level of international morality
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domestic critics. The physiological eﬀect of the media coverage of civil wars encourages
leaders to want to be seen as being responsive to the human tragedy. Although the public
opinion is often not well informed about the issues at stake in international crises, it might
have a strong inﬂuence on the decision-making elites. Similarly, a public that feels inse-
cure and has a perception of international security threats is likely to support demanding
international operations. Americans in 2001 believed that intervention in Afghanistan
was necessary to protect the most vital of US interests: the security of people and home-
land. As a result, the US intervened with overwhelming force with the intent to topple
the ruling regime. This event highlights a basic principle in the intervention dynamics:
in presence of a clear threat to national interests, there is no lack of political will and the
deployment is rapid and powerful (Lahneman, 2004).
However, in some countries public openness to peace operations does not automatically
extend to actions involving combat and politicians have to carefully justify the operation's
nature. The political system of wealthier countries has a greater sensitivity to the higher
value of life associated with economic growth. This sensitivity leads to engagements with
lower risk of casualties. The tolerance for causalities is often an obstacle, and it is deemed
to be one of the causes behind the unexpected US withdraw from Somalia in 1994. This
mechanism applies in particular to democratic countries where popular consensus is vital
to politicians seeking re-election or possessing a tiny parliamentary majority. Countries
are in general very cautious about intervening in risky conﬂicts where national security
is not at stake. Intervening countries have to demonstrate to their domestic populations
that their military eﬀorts are worthwhile, successful and at a tolerable cost (Freedman,
2007).
Procedural obstacles are also a severe limit to deployment. The institutional arrange-
ments, the diﬀerences in the roles of policymakers and in the degree of parliamentary
involvement in decision-making can lead to diﬀerent approaches to intervention. The
participation in UN operations, although undertaken as part of a multilateral and inter-
nationally legitimised deployment, is subject to a formal approval at the national level.
Some legal and constitutional frameworks set limits on the action national leaders can
take. In the case of EU members for instance, armed forces may be deployed only with
prior parliamentary consent and this veto power make it more diﬃcult for governments to
order and sustain the deployment of forces outside the nation's boundaries. As opposed
to Western countries, a weak system of checks and balances on executive action could
help to explain the ease with which African countries deploy troops in UN operations,
although we have never found any argument in the literature for this hypothesis. Robust
rules of engagement and an international command are also diﬃcult to be accepted by
states that seek more control over the operation. We should add that many nations have
severe restrictions on the deployment of conscripts, which in few armies made up the bulk
of active personnel.
However, sheer political considerations are the ultimate determinants. States have dif-
ferent views about the primary function of the armed forces. Some favour force projection
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over territorial defence. In countries like UK force projection is the overarching purpose
of the armed forces and their sphere of inﬂuence and interests is seen well beyond their re-
gion. 2 The image of itself as a guardian of the global order is responsible for the attitude
towards military intervention (Heiselberg, 2003). On the contrary, there is a wide group
of countries with long-standing foreign policy against sending troops abroad. Germany
for instance rejects its past military excess and as a consequence German strategic culture
has often valued military force only as a deterrent. Indeed, German strategic culture has
often come to prominence as a "culture of restraint" (Giegerich, 2008). Also the support
for missions may be strictly associated to the public conﬁdence that national forces could
achieve their goals. Austrian historical experience of being on the loosing side in both
world wars has created the feeling that security could be achieved by neutrality and that
war is unwinnable because of its perceived weakness (Giegerich, 2008). For less democratic
countries that have experienced military involvements in national politics, peacekeeping
can be a stratagem to insulate domestic politics from military interference by diverting
armed forces from the domestic to the international arena, like Latin American states,
such as Argentina (Norden, 1995). Velazquez (2002) deﬁnes this strategy as diversionary
peace. In the ﬁeld of political concerns, we include less persuasive arguments. National
leaders may fear that, while abroad, troops may change their mind about their country,
the political system, the culture and the religion. National pride and inferiority are also
at play here: national troops might make a poor impression compared to troops of more
advanced nations when working together (Daniel et al., 2008).
3.2 Technical factors
Among the internal determinants of a country's intervention proﬁle we would expect to
ﬁnd the institutional decision-making process, the strategic culture of a country, the na-
tional identity, the historical experience and the public opinion, namely the domestic
consensus on participation, broadly reﬂected in the support of international deployment.
However, technical factors can easily hamper this support and the willingness to par-
ticipate. Technical factors, such as the number of national armed forces personnel; the
military expenditure per capita; the mission costs and reimbursements; and the partic-
ipation in multiple missions, are often signiﬁcant obstacles to increasing peacekeeping
forces. In many instances soldiers, including those employed in advanced militaries, are
neither trained nor expected to deploy abroad, being conscripts or reserve forces. Some
smaller nations do not have contingents (as opposed to individual military, police and
civilian personnel) that meet minimum UN standards for deployment. Only 62 UN Mem-
ber States - roughly 40 % of the total - maintain forces ready for more intensive missions
(Center on International Cooperation, 2009).
As a consequence, a minority of states, those that are superior in ground force quality
and numbers, are expected to deploy forces when they are already sustaining missions
2Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom, Strategic Defence Review: Modern Forces for the Modern
World, July 1998
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elsewhere. They function on the basis of the rotation cycleconcept. The concept predicts
that when a peace unit is deployed (on average for six months), one is preparing to
deploy and a third one is in post-deployment rest. This cycle means that a more accurate
indicator of the stress on the military is given by three times the percentage of a nation's
force deployed at one time (Daniel et al., 2008) . Deploying forces abroad for some states
means the reduction in their ability to protect their homeland. Indeed, the primary
concern of many states remains their own defense. Over half the top 20 troop suppliers to
UN operations border on at least one fragile state (Center on International Cooperation,
2009). This last point is particularly true for countries with a critical force to space ratio,
like many African countries that can hardly protect their territorial integrity.
An implicit assumption behind technical limitations is that the participation in UN
operations negatively aﬀects the participation in another set of operations, say non-UN.
Obviously, a soldier or helicopter under NATO command cannot simultaneously be in a
UN mission.The participation in one set of operations negatively aﬀects the participation
in the other. An assumption of competitive relationship is also at play here (Daniel
et al., 2008). NATO members have also to meet their alliance commitments in terms
of manpower and materials required to achieve set objectives and might not be able to
"generate" additional forces, (indeed the NATO procedure for staﬃng an operation is
often referred to as "force generation").
Financial costs limit the number of troops that a nation can deploy. Money is per-
haps the motivation more often brought forward for developing countries' contribution to
peacekeeping. There is some doubt about UN inclination to subsidize developing coun-
tries' troops during peace missions (i.e. the UN pays them for borrowing their troops).
The myth of mercenarism and the mercenarization of UN forces has been often de-
nounced by several practitioners and scholars, among others Kinloch-Pichat (2004). He
claims that the defects ascribed to ad-hoc national contingents are those historically
attributed to mercenary forces: foreign allegiance, corruption and unwillingness to take
the necessary risks when it comes to ﬁghting. Peacekeeping contracts are lucrative and
are often used as leverage, in order to inﬂuence the providers of troops. The cost of
UN peacekeeping missions include the compensation for troop contribution at a rate of
US$ 1,028 per month per troop, the repayment for use of provider's own equipment and
clothing (US$68), the repayment for personal weaponry (US$5), a supplementary pay
for specialists (US$303), and disability costs.3 Although the reimbursement should be
contextualized by taking into account the exchange rate, for those countries who deploy
large peacekeeping forces, the earning is a signiﬁcant proportion of the defence budget,
even in countries with a large standing army. Bangladesh, for example, earns US$300m a
year, a huge reimbursement for a low-income economy. Around half goes directly to the
soldiers. 4
3UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations website
4"Major Furuque Hassan, a military intelligence oﬃcer in Dhaka, is a representative Bangladeshi
peacekeeper. His one-year tour in Cote D'Ivoire netted him savings of 2m taka ($30, 000), enough to buy
two plots of land back home. He describes the tour as his pension fund, a reward for 15 years of service."
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Findlay (1996a) argues that some poor countries can make a proﬁt on peacekeeping,
however the UN is so slow in paying and the amount so relatively niggardly that this
cannot be a sole motivating factor. According to McDermott (2000), only 30% of peace-
keeping assessment are paid in the ﬁrst three months and 60% in the ﬁrst six months.
Poorer troop contributing countries, who send the lowest paid forces, are reimbursed
more than their actual costs. A system of ﬁxed reimbursement redistributes resources to
developing countries, without requiring that that surpluses be reinvested in equipment or
training useful to the UN (Durch, 1993). A main concern is that well equipped and well
trained troops from Western countries are less inclined to participate in UN operations
in the developing world. Indeed, Western governments have to ﬁll the gap between what
the international system is willing to pay for peacekeeping troops (as reﬂected by the UN
reimbursement) and the amount they actually pay volunteer troops. Also, the value of life
increases as the nation develops (Seiglie, 2005), therefore UN cash remuneration might
not suﬃce to oﬀset the risks and costs of contribution. The conclusion is that regions
with a huge demand for peacekeeping have a low-quality provision of troops.
Bilateral military aids from rich allies is also a good incentive to provide peacekeeping
services, like the US military assistance to Bangladesh (Krishnasamy, 2003). The post-
conﬂict reconstruction market, and the provision of services, is generally secured by ﬁrms
whose home countries took part in the operation. Finally, the armed forces of developing
countries may also receive better equipments from Western contributors, as happened in
Somalia and in Bosnia (Findlay, 1996b).
Peacekeeping is certainly habit forming: the greater is the record of commitment
established, the more expected will be the deployment in future conﬂicts. Long-term
data suggests the persistent presence of selected countries in the over-contribution side
of peacekeeping; once states start deploying forces to peace operations, they do not stop.
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Jordan are examples of states who sustain a deﬁnitive
commitment to peace. Peacekeeping might be habit forming because commitments are
never short term. Also the defence establishment may consider peacekeeping as a way to
enhance their visibility and increase the defence budget. Finally, the expertise acquired
during past operations may lead to a comparative advantage in peace missions. Due to the
rotation cycle, even a small contribution over a long period means that a large proportion
of military personnel gain experience abroad. In many instances the experience of peace-
keeping operations helps in domestic counter-insurgency, and this might be the case of
India in Assam, Kashmir and Punjab (Sorenson and Wood, 2005). Forty-four countries
have also established peacekeeping training centres, in order to foster the cooperation
among the peacekeepers, to improve their expertise and for a better understanding of the
war environment through the exposure to conﬂict. The previous engagement, and maybe
performance, along with ad-hoc facilities might lead to future willingness to participate.
(The Economist, Feb 21st 2007)
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3.3 International component
Bellamy et al. (2004) categorize the motivations behind the intervention through the re-
lation between the intervener's standing in the international distribution of power and
the host country. They ﬁnd four categories: great powers; regional hegemons; former
colonial powers; and neighbours. Unquestionably, status considerations, along with inter-
national strategic concerns, the consolidation of neighbourhood stability, the protection
of resources' supply routes and the presence of expatriate communities play a role in the
decision to intervene. A vague commitment to international security can not be invoked
as sole motivation.
To begin with, military contribution to international crisis management is strictly
linked with the level of ambition of countries and regional organizations. Ambition is
a reliable measure of the desire to establish and assert a role in international security
matters. Peacekeeping is part of a strategy that fosters the integration and increases
the states' recognition into international and regional organizations. Thus it is not only
about national standing in the UN but also the European position in NATO and African
involvement in the AU. A security policy paper published by the Austrian Ministry of
Defence in 2006 argues that the level of ambition,( and therefore the maximum military
contribution to international crisis management), is a consequence of the international
position of a state in terms of geography, prestige and involvement in international orga-
nizations. 5. Ambition is the product of a "political system dealing with a diverse set of
internal and external pressures" (Giegerich, 2008)
The combined forces of the permanent ﬁve member of the Security Council constitute
a fair chunk of peacekeeping troops. As Kennedy (2006) describes in his history of the
UN, the authority over international order was centralized in the hands of the great
powers. The permanent members of the security council were identiﬁed as providers of
international security , unlike the weak countries like former Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia
who were consumers of security. P5 participation in various peace operations may serve
to legitimate their permanent seat in the Security Council.
Canada, Scandinavia and other members of the traditional peacekeeping "ﬁre brigade"
consider participation as a way to enhance their standing in the international community
and a prerequisite for middle power status in the UN (international actors worthy of re-
spect). The rising great power theory suggests that there are a number of normative
expectations towards the emerging powers in the international community. India and
Pakistan like to see global policing as a sign of their emergence as a world power (players
of global scope). Brazil, Nigeria and South Africa may link participation to their desire to
be seen as regional leaders and as candidates for a permanent seat in the Security Coun-
cil. China, a non-democratic country in the Security Council, may want to project the
5Heiko Borchert, Johann Frank and Gustav E. Gustenau, 'Politischer Wert/ Nutzen von Engage-
ments im Bereich des internationalen Krisenmanagements unter besonderer Beachtung von Beitrgen
und Entwicklungsoptionen des sterreichischen Bundesheeres', Austrian Ministry of Defence, 'Beitrge zur
Sicherheitspolitik' [security policy papers], January 2006
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image of a responsible country , committed to sustaining the UN system. Moreover, in
dealing with its incongruities, China tries to be perceived as the distinctive power, which
supports the interests of the developing world (Zhongying, 2005). Germany, Japan and
South Korea may see participation as a part of "their coming out as normal countries that
possess regionally economic and military clout" (Daniel et al., 2008). Contributing to the
international security, peace and justice through the military is again seen as normatively
acceptable by both the population and the international community. Argentina's deploy-
ment of troops in UN PKOs was a way to regain some of the prestige it lost during the
Falkland War (Sorenson and Wood, 2005). In essence peacekeeping displays most of the
characteristics of a "club good" (Solomon, 2007).
States are also drawn to the incentive of responsibility within or over a mission. Coun-
tries that are given operational command positions in the ﬁeld tend to be more committed
to operations. Brazil agreed to the mission in Haiti in part to show its commitment to
hemispheric security - and a Brazilian Force Commander has taken greater risks with
Brazilian troops than would have been possible for an oﬃcer from another country (Cen-
ter on International Cooperation, 2009).
Governments that emerge from the authority of an external power (or those formerly
under a military regime) may use peacekeeping to signal the end of an internationally
ostracised governments and the begin of a new era for the foreign policy (Findlay, 1996b).
Peacekeeping enhances national prestige, therefore it is not only the national armed forces
that seek a national role and gain beneﬁts, but also the foreign ministry, perhaps prodded
by its mission to the UN in New York (Findlay, 1996b). Similarly, refusing to participate
may be seen as an attempt to avoid blackballing. The UN mistrust of Iran, North Korea
and Israel intentions dampen any domestic willingness to participate. Taiwan would
probably face criticism from China and so on.
The main peacekeeping countries are not expected to stimulate, even indirectly, the
global arms race. However, table 2 shows that 17 of the 30 top contributing countries in
the last decade are also ranked among the largest arms exporters. This seems to be the
most frequent common feature among the top contributing countries. Thus, countries
whose reputation is based on their participation in peace operations are the main world
supplier of conventional weapons. On this point, Neack (1995) argues that this correlation
casts doubts on their commitment to the international security. Indeed, the idealist theory
of promoting peace cannot reconcile this inconsistency. Moreover, although arms transfers
are consistent with the realist view that both arms sales and peacekeeping serves the same
national interests, UN peacekeeping may be interpreted as a palliative administered after
the self- interested act of selling arms ignites regional animosities(Neack, 1995). However
the measure of export is aggregate, therefore most countries do not sell to the same places
they send peacekeepers. We argue that the relations is partly explained by the fact that
arms sales is a measure of integration into global military system as may be peacekeeping.
When a conﬂict is regarded as a threat to global stability, security concerns will trigger
nation-speciﬁc responses. Such interest includes the possibility that a conﬂict may spill
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Supplier[1] Contributor to PKO[2] Supplier Contributor
1 USA* USA* 16 Poland* Australia*
2 Russia* Pakistan 17 Belgium South Africa*
3 Germany* United Kingdom* 18 Norway Spain*
4 France* Bangladesh 19 South Korea* Canada*
5 UK* France* 20 Belarus Ethiopia
6 China* India 21 Denmark Kenya
7 Sweden Italy* 22 South Africa* South Korea*
8 Netherlands* Nigeria 23 Czech Republic Morocco
9 Italy* Germany* 24 Slovakia Rwanda
10 Ukraine* Russia* 25 Australia* Turkey*
11 Israel Ghana 26 Turkey* Senegal
12 Canada* Nepal 27 Brazil* Ukraine*
13 Switzerland Poland* 28 Austria Netherlands*
14 Spain* Jordan 29 Georgia China*
15 Uzbekistan Uruguay 30 Finland Brazil*
Table 1: [1]Top 30 suppliers of major conventional weapons in the period 2001-2006 [2]Top
30 contributors to multilateral peace operations in the period 1999-2009. Arms export ranking
is according to SIPRI aggregate exports. Deployment ranking calculated by adding countries'
number of billets in any operation (with billet deﬁned as one serviceman for one year). *Seventeen
countries appear in both ranking.
over into surrounding areas. A geographic proximity to the country in conﬂict increases
the utility a neighbouring country expects to get from the cessation of the hostilities
in three ways. Firstly, sharing a border with a country at war means an increase in
the probability of instability in the surrounding area. As a consequence the national
security is endangered by the risk of contagion. Existing research relates contemporary
civil wars not only to country-speciﬁc factors within individual states; it appears that
many civil wars display a transnational character, where actors, resources, and events
span national boundaries. Gleditsch (2007) distinguishes among transnational linkages
that may underlie geographic contagion. Secondly, the ethnic aﬃnities in neighbouring
communities are generally very signiﬁcant. Thirdly, the fear that the local conﬂict may
expand and draw in unwanted external actors leads to some forms of intervention.
For these reasons, beneﬁts from peace are unevenly distributed. The beneﬁts from
bringing to an end a civil war in a region are greater for nations in that speciﬁc re-
gion. Also, trade ﬂow and economic growth are enhanced for neighbours. As a result,the
positive externalities generated by an operation are ﬁrst and foremost consumed by the
conﬂict-ridden country and by the neighbouring countries, that are particularly at risk
due to their proximity to the conﬂict. Nevertheless, peacekeepers do not just deploy
within their region of origin or its immediate neighbourhood. There are too many ex-
ceptions, among other the European forces under NATO and Asian forces under UN
command. Also, deployments are far from short-range even when we look at the same
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broadly deﬁned region. East African troops operate in West African operations, and vice
versa, and Latin American forces, such as Argentina and Chile, are a long way from Haiti.
The EU deployments, for example, are mixed. We have two distant areas of operation:
EU missions in Africa (such as Artemis in Congo or EUROFOR in Chad/CAR) and EU
mission in the Balkans (Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina). Ad-hoc coalitions are either
made up by neighbor states, such as ISF in East Timor, RAMSI in the Solomon Islands
and SAPSDI in Burundi, or by former colonial powers (France in Cote d'Ivoire). Cer-
tainly, countries operate through their regional organisations; Africans through the AU,
Europeans through the EU and NATO and former Soviet Republics (Russia in particular)
through the CIS. Actions are driven by a sense of identity towards regional organizations.
A conﬂict may upset a regional balance or provide opportunities for a rival power to
increase its inﬂuence by intervening on one side of the conﬂict. It is also an attempt to
establish a precedent that would justify future involvement in the aﬀairs of the region. A
military presence in a region can legitimate an heavier deployment if necessary. Russian
involvement in the aﬀairs of the neighbouring states, in Abkhazia in particular, is often
disguised by its will to participate to CIS operations in the area, apparently with the
aim of stemming the violence and the instability through a permanent military presence.
Indeed, maintaining a permanent level of tension in the area justiﬁes that Moscow keeps
a military presence and levers on former Soviet republics (Facon, 2006).
Bringing to an halt the conﬂict is important to the intervener because of the conﬂict's
eﬀects on its relation with the disputing parties. The intervener can also increase its
presence and inﬂuence in a region by becoming guarantor of an agreement. With par-
ticular reference to the last point, there are many areas in the world that are considered
strategically interesting, and are becoming more central in ways that transcend altruistic
motivations. In Africa for example we observe a growing engagement of China, India,
and Russia, all keen to tap into natural resources. Indeed the continent has taken on
increased relevance to the extent that its aﬀairs aﬀect energy security stakes, but also
immigration policies and international terrorism. 6 There is also the need to keep en-
ergy supplies ﬂowing and international waterways accessible. The US determination to
ensure access to overseas supplies of vital resources and the protection of global resources
ﬂows is becoming increasingly important in the American security policy (Klare, 2002)
Somalia, deﬁned in military strategy as a choke point, is a prominent issue today in the
shipments of goods, particularly oil, between Europe and Asia. Its geo-strategic position
in the Horn of Africa could help to explain the presence of 28,000 personnel under UN
authority and 1,167 troops under US operational control, stationed on US Navy ships oﬀ
the coast of Somalia.
In presence of a large population displacement or an imminent humanitarian crisis,
the probability of participation should increase. There are beneﬁts to intervening in civil
6At the beginning of 2008 there were four times as many UN troops in Africa as there had been in
all UN peacekeeping operations around the world ten years previously; furthermore, three of the four
biggest UN missions where in Africa (IISS Strategic Survey, 2008).
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wars with humanitarian implications and domestic costs of not intervening. Dowty and
Loescher (1996) argue that refugee ﬂows can impose costs that aﬀect the national interests
and that interventions in conﬂicts with large refugee ﬂows are justiﬁed by international
conventions. Germany and Italian involvement in SFOR (Bosnia) and KFOR (Kosovo)
averted the risk of a huge refugees pouring into their territories.
Expatriate communities threatened in conﬂict zones, as well as past colonial links
also play a role. Germany's participation in UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)
in Namibia was vital for the protection of 20,000 German Namibians. Individually-led
military missions in former colonial spheres, such as Britain's in Sierra Leone and France's
in Côte d'Ivoire are perhaps the most conceivable forms of intervention.
Sometimes, we imputed for the same country a set of interests that would explain in-
tervention and another conceivable set that would explain non-intervention. This is what
Finnemore (2006) deﬁnes as the common problem with the traditional Realpolitik formu-
lation ': interests are simply indeterminate. Many explanations have severe limits, some
are exclusive of others and generalization is diﬃcult. In attempting an econometric anal-
ysis of the determinants of peacekeeping contribution, we need a theoretical framework to
determine the functional form; help select the relevant variables; allow the speciﬁcation
of casualty; and deﬁne the hypothesis.
4 Theoretical Model
We use a standard neo-classical model of the state as a rational actor maximizing utility
subject to a resource constraint. International peace is a public good (Kindleberger,
1986). As such, the consumption of security is not-excludable and non-rivalrous. No other
country can be eﬀectively excluded from its beneﬁts and the consumption of security by
one country does not reduce its availability for consumption by others. The provision of
security is costly and, as any public good, induces free-riding behaviours. As a result,
states have an incentive to free-ride on the troop contributions of the others, consuming
more than their fair share of peace but nonetheless receiving the same level of beneﬁts. As
the marginal costs incurred by the participants in a mission will outweigh its beneﬁts, this
leads to the under-provision of troops. Since any participant ignores the beneﬁts spillover
on other countries, and equates its marginal willingness to pay to the marginal costs, a sub-
optimal provision of troops follows (Shimizu and Sandler, 2002). However, peacekeeping
does not exclusively generate pure public beneﬁts, it also produces some excludable and
rival contributor-speciﬁc beneﬁts. Peacekeeping is impurely public because its beneﬁts
are not fully available to some countries and beneﬁts decline with the number of countries
deriving gains from such missions. Thus, peacekeeping yields joint products that are
purely public to the international community, impurely public to a sub-group of countries
and country-speciﬁc to the participants (Shimizu and Sandler, 2002). In case of such
impure public goods free-riding and its sub-optimality still exist, but not to the same
extent as predicted by the pure public goods model (Cornes and Sandler, 1996).
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We attempt to address two dilemma: one relates to the decision about either inter-
vening or not and the other question is about the optimal number of troops to provide
in case of intervention. For the ﬁrst problem, we need two distinct utility functions, the
expected utility for intervening EU Ii and the expected utility for not intervening EU
N
i .
We assume that both functions are strictly concave and increasing in their arguments.
Building partly on Regan (1998), EUNi can be expressed as:
EUNi = p[U
p
i ] + (1− p)[U ci ] (1)
where p represents the probability that the conﬂict will be settled without nation's i
intervention, Upi is the nation's i utility attached to peace without her intervention and
U ci is the utility of continued conﬂict. For simplicity, we assume that there are no costs
associated with not intervening.
Since peacekeeping generates both pure public beneﬁts and some excludable and rival
contributor-speciﬁc beneﬁts, a nation's expected utility for intervening EU Ii is given by:
EU Ii = q[U
s
i ] + (1− q)[Ufi ]−
∑
CIi (2)
where q is the probability of a successful intervention with nation's i contribution,
Usi is the utility associated with a successful outcome and U
f
i reﬂects the utility to the
potential intervener from an unsuccessful intervention.
∑
CIi are the costs associated
with intervention.
The decision to intervene is a process given by
EU Ii − EUNi = q[Usi ] + (1− q)[Ufi ]−
∑
CIi − p[Upi ]− (1− p)[U ci ] (3)
When EUI−EUN > 0 there will be intervention. Therefore the decision is strongly in-
ﬂuenced by the expected marginal impact of country i on the global intervention outcome,
by the conﬂict characteristics, captured by p, and by countries' individual preferences over
outcomes. Hence, we need to assume a priori a sort of utility ordering, which is country-
speciﬁc. For some countries the utility of continued ﬁghting might be higher than the
utility from a failed peacekeeping intervention, because they might value much more the
media eﬀect of peacekeeping or the global image. Others might prefer intervention to a
self-settlement without their involvement because the country-speciﬁc beneﬁts of inter-
vention (e.g. involvement in the aﬀairs of the region, permanent military presence) are
higher than the global public characteristics (e.g. global instability, oil ﬂow disruption,
peace). Countries derive utility from characteristics of peacekeeping rather than peace-
keeping itself. As we said, not all of the beneﬁts of peacekeeping are global public goods;
many are either private goods or public goods whose beneﬁts are either speciﬁc to the
host nation or to neighbouring nations.
Since peacekeeping generates both pure public beneﬁts and some excludable and rival
contributor-speciﬁc beneﬁts, we need to better specify the utility function. For this
purpose, we make some assumptions. We study a simple example, with two military
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goods, one si is private, and can be thought as the number of troops employed within
the national boundaries. The other good, T, is a public good, which is the size of the
country i 's own peacekeeping contributions and those of the other n-1 nations. The
countries initially have some endowment of the private good, Ni and determine how much
to contribute to the public good. Each nation faces a troops constraint when choosing
among peacekeeping ti and other military activities si. If country i decides to contribute
ti , he will have si = Ni − ti of private security consumption. The primary function
of armed forces personnel Ni is the protection from foreign threats and from internal
conﬂict, but they are also used in public safety roles with police duties among the civilian
population and in emergency civil support tasks in post-disaster situations. All these
duties are captured by si. Each unit of peacekeeping generates two joint products, a
private beneﬁt αti and a global purely public characteristic βti. α and β are positive
parameters and account for the inevitable coexistence of altruistic motivations (β) with
the egoistic considerations (α) of intervening states.
To simplify the problem, let us assume that in equation 3 the utilities to country's i
from continued war, regardless of its intervention, are both small enough to be considered
negligible, therefore Ufi ≈ 0 and U ci ≈ 0. In the same equation, p and q account for
the outcome of the intervention, which is decided by country's i participation and the
coalition's relative investment in ﬁghting. We may consider a unique probability σ as a
success ratio, given by
σ(ti) =
Tn−i + ti
M + Tn−i + ti
(4)
where the intervener ﬁghting eﬀort is measured by the scale of his deployment and M is
the belligerents' strength and therefore their resistance against a third party involvement.
When ti = Tn−i = 0 there are no chances that the conﬂict will be settled without any
third party involvement. Let us deﬁne a utility function, that captures both the decision
about intervention and the optimal number of troops to dispatch in peace operations. The
utility is deﬁned over the space of private and public characteristics, is strictly increasing
in consumption of both the private and the public good, quasiconcave, continuous and
everywhere twice diﬀerentiable. With an adaptation of Khanna et al. (1999) model and
following equation 3, country i 's expected utility function can be written as follow:
EUi = σ(ti)U [αti, β(ti + Tn−1), si, Q]− Ci(ti) (5)
Q is added to the function to capture any factor that can inﬂuence the utility from
peacekeeping, such as the proximity to the conﬂict region, the presence of an expatriate
community or the trading with the region. Ci(ti) are the costs of participation. Account-
ing for the cost of a peace mission is complicated.7 Besides the obvious military costs,
7SIPRI provides budget costs for UN multilateral peace operations. They refer to core operational
costs, which include the cost of deploying personnel and direct non-ﬁeld support costs. The cost is
shared by all UN member states through a specially designed scale of assessed contributions that takes
no account of their participation in the operations. The estimated cost for UN peacekeeping in 2009 was
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the most important is the loss of life in peacekeepers ranks. In economics, the value of
life is calculated through the income, or more precisely the discounted value of earnings
foregone by individuals. To make the problem easier, we assume that the cost function
can be expressed as
Ci(ti) = w tiR(M) (6)
where w is the unit cost of a soldier, that is the value of life, and the function R
measures the risk of the mission and is increasing in its argument M. A traditional peace-
keeping force into the midst of active and heavy hostilities, captured by an high value
of the hostile parties' strength M, might not have the capacity to suppress the conﬂict
and may even be limited in its ability to defend itself. On the contrary, low values of
M result in higher odds of establishing peace (equation 4) and a lower risk of casualties
(6). Deﬁning x as the nation-speciﬁc output αti and y as the global public characteristics















The condition for eﬃciency is that the marginal beneﬁt of providing peacekeeping
(left-hand side of equation 7) equals the marginal costs (right-hand side). In our case the
marginal beneﬁt is the sum of the utility weighted by the marginal impact of a soldier on
the probability that intervention will be successful and the marginal utility of the private
and purely public activity weighted by the probability of success. The marginal beneﬁt is
oﬀset by the sum of the opportunity cost of having less soldiers for national duties times
the probability of success and the expected marginal cost of casualties.
The value placed on soldiers life is reﬂected by the salary.8 Therefore, we will try
to verify the general assumption that valuation of life in wealthier nations envisages
a casualties-adverse approach that causes an under provision of optimal peacekeeping
troops. As a result, the salaries' level and the risk associated with a mission, which in
turn means sensitivity to casualties, is a strong determinant in the decision to intervene.
To this end, we will use the military expenditure per soldier to proxy for the military
compensations. Also, we will consider the number of deaths among the peacekeepers as
a factor inﬂuencing the level of risk.
Because of the high relative value of labour, the optimal strategy for western countries
is to become more capital or weapon intensive (Seiglie, 2005).On the other side, the typical
proﬁle of the intervener country is capital-poor and labour-rich, and this capital-poverty
US$7.75bn (FT 4/8/2009). In the same year, US$157bn have been allocated to the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan by the US (National Priorities Project, 2009).
8Indeed, attracting and keeping high-quality personnel is a challenge for the military services in
Western countries. As a result of greater private-sector opportunities, the military have to adjust com-
pensations .NATO and EU members compensate soldiers with salaries that are usually more generous
than the world average.
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means having large, non technologically sophisticated armies. A second prediction is
that poor countries exploit their comparative advantage in manpower; consequently, the
number in armed forces of a country determines the likelihood and the size of intervention.
In order to describe the Nash equilibrium and to obtain the reaction function of coun-
try i , we employ a more useful way . We simplify the model by normalizing the exogenous
parameters α, β and Q and the endogenous probability of success σ . The quantity of
a country i 's provision of the public good is still denoted by ti. However one unit of




ti = Tn−i + ti, the utility maximization problem can be written as
Max
si,ti
[Ui(si, ti, T ) s.t. si + ti = Ni, T = Tn−i + ti] (8)
where the rescaled utility function Ui keeps the properties of being strictly increasing
and quasiconcave. Adding Tn−i to both sides of the budget constraint and using the fact
that T = Tn−i + ti, we can rewrite this country's problem as
Max
T,ti
[Ui(si, ti, T ) s.t. si + T = Ni + Tn−i, T ≥ Tn−i] (9)
Equation 11 says that a country i is choosing the total amount of peacekeeping subject
to the constraint that the amount she chooses must be at least as large as the amount
provided by the other countries. The troops constraint says that the total value of
her security consumption must equal the value of her troop endowment, Ni + Tn−i.
Substituting the constraints into the objective function, we can rewrite this problem as a
choice over the aggregate (global) level of peacekeeping
Max
T≥Tn−i
[Ui(Ni + Tn−i − T, T − Tn−i, T )] (10)
Problem 12 is like any consumer maximization problem, and a country's optimal choice
of peacekeeping T will be a continuous function of the national endowment
Fi(Ni + Tn−i, Tn−i) ≥ Tn−i (11)
Each country's level of private provision of peacekeeping can be written as
ti = Fi(Ni + Tn−i, Tn−i)− Tn−i ≥ 0. (12)
This expression is the reaction function for country i and gives her optimal contribu-
tion as a function of the other countries' contribution.
Typically, in models of private provision of private goods, a further assumption is the
normality condition, satisﬁed if we suppose that both the private and public goods are
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This implies that reaction functions have slopes greater than −1 and less or equal
to zero. Therefore an increase in other countries' contribution Tn−i must increase her
demand for the public good and not decrease her demand for the private good.
An easier formulation to have a better idea of the best-response function is
ti = Max[Fi(Ni + Tn−i)− Tn−i, 0] (14)
The last expression shows that each country either contributes a positive amount
or completely free rides and contributes zero. Finally a Nash equilibrium is a set of
contributions {ti}ni=1 that satisﬁes the aggregation rule T ∗ =
n∑
i=1
t∗i . Kotchen (2007)
provides a proof of existence and uniqueness of this Nash equilibrium in impure public
good model.
Although intervention is inﬂuenced by a complex and interconnected number of the
above factors, very often diﬃcult to distinguish, we derive a set of testable hypotheses
from the theoretical arguments surrounding the participation dilemma. To provide an
estimable supply function, the economic variables need to be speciﬁed, and the political
and strategic determinants quantiﬁed. The empirical analysis will control for covariates
corresponding to the conﬂict and operation characteristics, to participant country capa-
bilities and for the economic importance of the country in which the conﬂict takes place,
the host country. The econometric speciﬁcation corresponding to the discussion about
the supply equation (decision to participate and number of troops to provide) is then
modelled as follows:
Yit = β1tXit + β2tWit + β3tZit + β4tHit + µi + εit i = 1, ..., N ; t = 2, ...T (15)
where Xit contains a set of covariates corresponding to the operation characteristics,
in terms of mission strength, yearly costs and the number of deaths among peacekeepers.
Wit accounts for the conﬂict characteristics, and includes the conﬂict intensity and the
number of displaced persons. Zit represents the set of participant's capabilities in terms
of military expenditure per capita, number in armed forces and the number of concurrent
military operations. Hit indicates the host country (where the operation takes place) and
captures host country's economic salience in terms of participant-speciﬁc interests from
peacekeeping, such as the trade openness and the foreign direct investment ﬂows to the
conﬂict region. Finally, µi is the individual-speciﬁc eﬀects.
5 Econometric Strategy
The aim of the empirical investigation is twofold: understanding which factors, both ob-
served and unobserved, are behind the country's decision to participate in a peacekeeping
operation, and which of these factors can explain the number of soldiers deployed by a
country in a speciﬁc mission. To deal with both questions, the paper uses a range of
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models and estimators. In particular, we use static discrete choice models to analyse
the probability of participating, ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrst diﬀerence panels regression models
when we look at the number of soldiers deployed in a particular mission.
If we considered each operation UN Charter, Chapter VI and VII, as "192 UN members
intervention potential", the approach would be methodological wrong. Many countries
have a long-lasting tradition of non-intervention. Few are considered lawless or failed
states, such as the Somali Republic or Iraq, therefore incapable of projecting troops
abroad. Others have no military resources; approximately 24 countries (the ﬁgures vary
from diﬀerent sources) have either no military forces or no standing army. In addition,
according to the Military Balance 2009, 12 countries have less than 1000 armed forces
personnel. Therefore we consider as potential intervener any state that participated in at
least one peace operation with at least one soldier in the decade. We only consider troops,
therefore excluding military observers, civilian police and civilian staﬀ. This choice gives
102 countries and 2889 positive observations. The dependent variable is a dichotomous
one that takes on the value of one in the case of participation and zero in the case of
non-contribution. The observational unit is country-operation-year; as a result, in the
participation model, we end up with 8771 observations.
In the second step the dependent variables are the number of troops provided to any
operation and the percentage (%) of the total number of active armed forces deployed. The
last variable is an approximate measure of the eﬀort sustained, since in many operations
some countries supply a nominal number of personnel compared to the size of their ground
forces. The size is a challenging variable, more than the pure decision about participation,
because it is deeply inﬂuenced by a mixture of unquantiﬁable factors, some of which are
domestic and depend on the political feasibility of such action, while others relate to the
demand and expectations of the international community. Both the participation and the
troops' contribution model share the same structure, that is, they controls for covariates
corresponding to the conﬂict itself, for country features and characteristics of the host
country . The country decision to participate and the country decision about the numbers
of troops to provide is modelled as in equation 15.
5.1 Modelling participation
A country decision to participate is modelled according to the following reduced form
model for participation:
Pr[yit = 1|xit, αi] = Φ(x′itβ + αi) i = 1, ..., N ; t = 2, ...T (16)
where x is a vector of strictly exogenous observed explanatory variables and β is the
associated coeﬃcient vector. The covariates vector x includes information on the conﬂict,
the peace operation, the participating country and the host country. The model also has
a random intercept αi to account for individual-speciﬁc unobserved characteristics. Φ is
the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variate.
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The standard uncorrelated random eﬀects model assumes αi uncorrelated with xit.
Alternatively, following Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain et al. (1984), correlation be-
tween αi and the observed characteristics can be allowed by assuming a relationship of
the form αi = x′ia+ εi and with εi independent of x
′
i. Thus the model may be written as:
Pr[yit = 1|xit, αi] = Φ(x′itβ + x′ia+ εi) i = 1, ..., N ; t = 2, ...T (17)
In order to check the robustness of the random eﬀect probit, we run a random eﬀect
complementary log log speciﬁcation, which considers any asymmetry in the distribution
of the dependent variable. Finally, to relax the distributional assumption about the
unobserved heterogeneity parameter, we estimate a linear probability model with ﬁxed
eﬀects.
5.2 Modelling contributions
In the second empirical part of the paper we try to identify the determinants of the




itβ + fi + it i = 1, ..., N ; t = 2, ...T (18)
where fi is the time invariant country-speciﬁc eﬀects and it is the error term.
In order to eliminate the ﬁxed eﬀect fi we apply the two customary transformation of
the original model: ﬁrst diﬀerences and the within transformation. The ﬁrst-diﬀerences
estimator is obtained by subtraction of the lagged one period model from the original
model (equation 18). The following model is then estimated
∆yit = ∆x
′
itβ + ∆fi + ∆it i = 1, ..., N ; t = 3, ...T (19)
The within model is obtained by subtraction of the time-averaged model from the
original model (18). Then:
yit − yi = (xit − xi)′β + (it − i) i = 1, ..., N ; t = 2, ...T (20)
In both procedures the country-speciﬁc eﬀects fi is removed.
As we said, we have two diﬀerent speciﬁcations for troop deployment, one has the
number of troops deployed as dependent variable LnYiot:
LnYiot = α+ βLnXiot + γLnZiot + iot (21)
where X is the total number of active forces of the country, and the other has the






= α+ γLnZiot + iot (22)
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Since in the ﬁrst speciﬁcation the number of national armed forces is used as covariate,
the second model seems a restricted version of the ﬁrst one with restriction β = 1. Before
proceeding with the estimation, we test such a restriction with the Wald test and the null
hypothesis is always rejected.
Modelling contribution clearly poses a sample selection problem. Since the decision
to intervene precedes the one about the number of troops to dispatch, the sample is ap-
parently non-randomly selected. Model's estimates based on such non-randomly selected
sample might be biased leading to erroneous conclusions (Heckman, 1981). Furthermore
the distribution of troops' contribution takes on non-negative values. A censored regres-
sion model might solve the problem and take care of the censoring by postulating a latent
distribution of troops' contribution for non-participant. However, this last hypothesis
is somehow puzzling for two reasons: ﬁrstly, as mentioned above, there are countries
incapable of projecting troops abroad and/or having no military resources, so troops'
contribution for these countries is necessarily zero. Secondly, the assumption of latent
negative values of the distribution of troops' contribution cannot be supported. Thirdly,
the censored regression model relies on the normality assumption of the latent variable,
which is strong parametric assumption. Tobit-type latent variable models make sense if
the data we are working with are truly censored. 9
In addition, the panel structure of our data would be mathematically complex to
combine with a censored regression model, a large burden of computer programming and
a set of strong distributional assumptions would be necessary for such a combination.
(see Hisiao (2001)) Furthermore, the selection equation, which requires by the normality
assumption a probit link function, is unidentiﬁed for ﬁxed eﬀects, so the probit random
eﬀects is the unique choice. The latter model would be reasonable if we had enough
covariates to model the participation equation. However, although well speciﬁed, we
believe our model is far to be saturated, mainly because of unquantiﬁable factors such as
political, strategical and social factors which aﬀect the decision.
Some scholars propose the use of non-parametric estimators for correcting selection
bias (amongst others Kyriazidou (1997)), but no method has been widely accepted so far.
As a consequence, we decide to rely on the customary linear panel model.
One might argue that the underlying process both for participation and troops' con-
tributions is dynamic, that is, it is likely that the decision in the previous period can
explain part of the variance of the dependent variable. If this is true the residuals of the
linear panel regression are serially correlated and we need to specify a dynamic model.
The GMM estimators of Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bond (1995) and Blun-
dell and Bond (1998) are well-suited for this case. We do such an exercise by estimating
dynamic regressions for the troops' contributions model and for the participation model.
Results of the dynamic models (not reported here, but available upon request) do not
show any signiﬁcant diﬀerence from those in the linear panel regressions or static random
9More cases against the misuse of a censored regression are developed in chapter 3 of Angrist and
Pischke (2009).
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eﬀect probit, even tough the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable is unresolved
in some regressions. A dynamic speciﬁcation is not an improvement in the methodol-
ogy, mainly because of the limits surrounding the GMM estimator; internal instruments,
though attractive as a response to endogeneity, have serious limitations Roodman and
Floor (2008). A large collection of instruments, even if individually valid, can be col-
lectively invalid in ﬁnite samples because they over-ﬁt endogenous variables. They also
weaken the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, which is commonly relied upon to
check instrument validity. Also Bun et al. (2009) highlight the weak instrument problem
for the system GMM model and suggest the use of testing procedures that are robust
to this issue. Thus, rather than relying on some speciﬁc procedure which are far to be
universally accepted, we choose to carry out our analysis by using more customary econo-
metric tools. However, this choice might also have its counterpart whether the linear
panel model is not the right one. A more extensive investigation is needed and we let it
for future research.
6 Empirical Results
In general, many results conﬁrm the arguments presented in the theoretical framework.
However, there are some relevant exceptions in which the sign of the coeﬃcient is not
in the direction predicted by the theoretical arguments. Table 2 presents the results
of the probit analysis and the complementary log-log model over the period 1999-2009.
The results apply to UN operations only. We do not consider non-UN missions, mainly
because grouping together diﬀerent categories with few common features results in a non
negligible heterogeneity. Taking them individually would result in a small sample size,
which makes diﬃcult any kind of inference.
Columns one, two and three report the estimates for the linear probability model,
probit and complementary log log model respectively. The conﬂict risk, captured by the
coeﬃcient of the number of deaths among peacekeepers, is not statistically diﬀerent from
zero over diﬀerent speciﬁcations. We leave the question about the way to proxy the risk
unresolved for the moment. Other countries' contribution, expressed by the deployment
total strength, is positive and signiﬁcant over alternative model versions, as expected.
The ﬁnancial costs of a mission, referred to core operational costs, and shared by all
UN member states, is used as a measure of the political importance of a mission. Costs
include all the direct non-ﬁeld support costs, thus it is not only a function of the number
of deployed personnel. Operations regarded as "`highly advisable" are those attracting
more funds. Unsurprisingly, the coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant, suggesting that the
higher the overall cost of the operation, the higher the probability of intervention.
An increase in the intensity of the conﬂict increases the likelihood of intervention in
UN missions. This ﬁnding is easily understandable as the conﬂict intensity proxies for
the security threat that a conﬂict poses. The numbers of displaced persons also increases
the likelihood of participation, thus conﬁrming the main Regan (1998) ﬁnding that a
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large social dislocation or humanitarian crisis increase the probability of intervention.
We measure the sustainability of deployment by the number of missions supported at
the same time. The positive sign of the coeﬃcient and the negative sign of its square
predict a negative eﬀect whenever the number of concurrent commitments exceed a certain
threshold, resulting in a an inversely U-shaped relationship.
The military capabilities are measured through the troops' quality- the military ex-
penditure per capita- and the troops quantity- the number in armed forces. The military
expenditure per soldier is used to estimate personnel costs incurred for the mission. We
are aware that using the entire defence budget overestimates the personnel budget. The
negative sign of military expenditure conﬁrms the "mercenarization" hypothesis and is
consistent with the assumption that poorer countries are more likely to join a UN op-
eration. The number in armed forces is negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting that those
inferior in ground force numbers are more likely to deploy forces. This result runs counter
to the hypothesized relation. The last two results together predict that the overall military
capabilities decrease the likelihood that an outside actor will intervene in UN operations.
Being among the UN security council candidates is not statistically signiﬁcant. Finally,
the economic salience in terms of trade openness aﬀects positively the likelihood of inter-
vention, although trade openness and FDI inﬂows do not tell a consistent story.
Tables from 3 to 7 provide the ﬁrst-diﬀerence estimates and the within estimates
for alternative versions of the troops contribution problem, where the logarithm of the
covariates is used where appropriate. Although Diﬀerence and System GMM are very
popular in short panels, their tendency to generate numerous instruments can have serious
limitations (Roodman and Floor, 2008). In our analysis, the choice of internal instruments
as a response to endogeneity might produce suspicious results. Generally the results,
available on request, does not change with a GMM estimator as in Blundell and Bond
(1998) and Arellano and Bond (1991). The dependent variables are the number of troops
provided (ﬁrst and second column) and the percentage of active armed forces deployed
to any operation(last two columns). The percentage is an approximate measure of the
eﬀort sustained. The number of deaths among peacekeepers and the mission costs are
not included as they are endogenous to the problem.
In table 3 we test the factors aﬀecting the size of contribution and countries' eﬀort in
UN missions. The conﬂict intensity and number of displaced people cause an increase in
the size of contribution (the number provided) and the country's eﬀort (the percentage
of the number in armed forces), although their are not statistically signiﬁcant when we
use the within transformation. The ﬁnding conﬁrms the previous results, thus supporting
that the media coverage of human rights violations and the global emergency that a
conﬂict poses urge governments to intervene with a large deployment. The sustainability
index is negative as expected, although it is not signiﬁcant. Military expenditure per
soldier is positive and signiﬁcant in the decision about the number of troops to dispatch
and when it comes to the eﬀort of participating. Intuitively, a large number of troops or
alternatively a large share of national forces deployed to any operation requires military
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capabilities and logistic support. The intervention's size decreases in the trade openness,
a result apparently counter-intuitive.
In table 4 we present a panel estimates of the drivers of Non-UN troops contribution,
following table 3 speciﬁcations. While the consequent results are very close to those
explaining the deployment eﬀort in UN operations , two exceptions are of interest. The
number of displaced people is not aﬀecting the percentage of national troops deployed
in the anticipated direction, thus suggesting that humanitarian crisis hamper the size
of contribution in ongoing Non-UN peace operations. The FDI is again negative and
signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level, while the trade openness is negative and not signiﬁcant.
These results are puzzling, although they conﬁrm the ﬁndings in table 3. We do not
attempt any particular explanation, however results emphasize that the motivations linked
to economic calculations cannot be accepted as an account of what motivates states to
intervene. The negative sign might indicate that conﬂicts, and then peacekeeping, emerge
during economic crisis and the disruption of international trade. Military expenditure per
soldier is positive and signiﬁcant only in the decision about the percentage of national
armed forces to commit. The sustainability of multiple missions inﬂuence negatively
both the number and the share of troops, although it is only signiﬁcant when the within
transformation is applied.
In table 5, a similar picture emerges from the estimates of the NATO-led and EU
missions. In addition to FDI, also trade openness is negative and signiﬁcant at the 0.05
level, stressing the negative inﬂuence of economic interests in a conﬂict region. Conﬂict
intensity is among the main drivers of peacekeeping and the sign is consistent with our
priors. The positive sign of military expenditure and the signiﬁcance at the 0.1 level
indicate that in NATO-led and EU missions, countries that are better able to sustain
a large proportion of national troops in multilateral peace operations are those whose
quality of military is higher.
Table 6 shows the results for NATO-led missions alone and Table 7 for EU missions.
Previous results are mostly conﬁrmed, except for the sustainability index, which is positive
and signiﬁcant in NATO missions and negative for EU members. Finally Table 8 reports a
panel estimation of contribution to operations conducted by the African Union (AU), the
Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC), Ad-hoc coalitions (e.g French
operation in Cote d'Ivoire) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Here,
it is worth underlining the positive and signiﬁcant impact of the conﬂict risk, captured
by the coeﬃcients of deaths among peacekeepers, on both the number of troops deployed
and the participation's eﬀort. The result is counter-intuitive, and we leave the question
about the way to proxy the risk unresolved for the moment. FID and trade openness are
both negative and signiﬁcant, stressing the need to reconsider the motivations linked to
economic calculations.
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7 Conclusion
This paper is the ﬁrst contribution in the literature that attempts to address, both theo-
retically and empirically, the many possible motivations that interact to produce a regular
peacekeeping contribution by a diverse pool of participants. After a wide discussion of
motivations that have been suggested by a numbers of scholars as explaining peacekeep-
ing contribution, our main argument is that many explanations have severe limits, some
are exclusive of others and generalization is diﬃcult. Given that national countries have
a variety of aims and the stated goal may be just a rhetoric of intervention, there are
diﬃculties about determining the objectives of the intervening governments. Empirical
results suggest that at the domestic level, technical forces such as the sustainability of
multiple missions and military capabilities all play a role. At the international level diﬀer-
ent factors inﬂuence the decision, such as the security threat that a conﬂict poses and the
number of displaced people. Quantiﬁable motivations play a role, especially those linked
to military capabilities and Realpolitik calculations, but they cannot be accepted as a
full account of what motivates diﬀerent actors and legitimising authorities to intervene.
Unquestionably, a big role is played by a number of immeasurable elements, such as the
state's national security culture, and its capacity for action that in turn is given by the
domestic public opinion and the political decision making process. Actions are also driven
by a sense of identity towards some regional organizations.
Along with the explosive growth in the demand for troops, there is an impressive rise
in the numbers and quality of troops required to fulﬁl new tasks. While the economic
crisis is leading to a cutback of peacekeeping expenditure, a new level of engagement is
deemed necessary to improve the eﬀectiveness of peace missions. Global costs would be
much higher if a scaling back led to a rise in insecurity and destabilization.
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Appendix
The database consists of 2889 observations on national contributions to 46 multilateral
peace operations conducted around the world in the period 1999-2009. We also include
US military operation in Iraq even though the number of troops deployed equals the
average yearly total from all other national deployment for 2003 through 2007. The
database provides information for the participating countries with the exact number of
troops supplied. This number has been replaced by the letter P when is not available
and the country is known to have participated. We use a range of sources to estimate the
national numbers of personnel deployed: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database,
IISS Military Balance, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations monthly summaries
and NATO data on troops contribution.
The database includes also information on: the legal basis for the establishment of an
operation( UN Security Council resolutions, NATO or other regional organizations); the
country in which a mission operates and where available the speciﬁc region of the country;
the dates of ﬁrst deployment; the number of fatalities suﬀered from the beginning of the
mission until the last reported date; the ﬁnancial costs in millions of US dollars; the
actual personnel number, including civil police, civil staﬀ and military observers, in order
to display the strength of the operation. The number of troops authorized is usually not
consistent with the actual number deployed.
Data on the number of armed forces personnel of all the world's armed forces from
1999 to 2009 are based on the IISS Military Balance. Military expenditure as a share of
GDP is supplied by SIPRI. Military expenditure per capita at constant (2005) US dollars
calculated as ratio of military expenditure (to the number in armed forces.
The conﬂict intensity is extracted from the Heidelberg Institute Conﬂict Barometer
dataset that identiﬁes ﬁve values: latent conﬂict, manifest conﬂict, crisis, sever crisis
and war. Where applicable the level refers to the speciﬁc region of a country (Kosovo,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Darfur, East-Timor, Eritrea-Ethiopia borders). Where more
then one conﬂict was present, the ﬁgure represents the highest intensity reached among
all conﬂicts The number of internally displaced persons is taken from the Internal Dis-
placement Monitoring Centre Database, The Oﬃce of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees and US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. Where applicable the number
refers to either the sub-region (e.g. Abkhazia) or the macro region (e.g. Ethiopia-Eritrea)
interested. In some cases sources vary signiﬁcantly.
Real per capita GDP (constant price, base year 2000) is calculated by deﬂating the
GDP per capita in US dollars provided by the IMF, World Economic Outlook Database
(April 2009).
Trade openness is the ratio of total trade (exports plus imports) to GDP each year(Alan
Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.3, Center for
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Penn-
sylvania, August 2009). 2007 data are used to assign missing data in 2008 and 2009.
FDI inﬂows are obtained from Foreign Direct Investment database, UNCTAD and are
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deﬂated using the US GDP deﬂator (2000). Data on FDI ﬂows are on a net basis (capital
transactions' credits less debits between direct investors and their foreign aﬃliates). Net
decreases in assets or net increases in liabilities are recorded as credits (with a positive
sign), while net increases in assets or net decreases in liabilities are recorded as debits
(with a negative sign). Hence, FDI ﬂows with a negative sign indicate that at least one
of the three components of FDI is negative and not oﬀset by positive amounts of the
remaining components. These are called reverse investment or disinvestment.
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Table 2: Static random eﬀect probit and complementary log log for participation proba-
bility, UN missions
Linear Prob. RE RE Complem.
Model OLS Probit†† log log††
Strength† 0.031*** 0.449*** 0.687***
(0.009) (0.101) (0.132)
Deaths† -0.003 -0.051 -0.057
(0.012) (0.169) (0.204)
Costs† 0.010** 0.208*** 0.184*
(0.005) (0.079) (0.101)
Conﬂict intensity 0.029*** 0.475*** 0.575***
(0.006) (0.074) (0.096)
Displaced† -0.000 0.142** 0.167*
(0.006) (0.069) (0.087)
Sustainability 0.068*** 1.281*** 1.699***
(0.010) (0.097) (0.127)
Sustainability2 -0.004*** -0.091*** -0.131***
(0.002) (0.017) (0.022)
Mil Exp per capita† -0.018** -0.408** -0.599*
(0.008) (0.181) (0.310)
No in Armed Forces† -0.015 -0.410** -0.625**
(0.009) (0.190) (0.317)
Trade openness† 0.166*** 2.322*** 3.289***
(0.025) (0.371) (0.490)
FDI inﬂows† -0.017*** -0.303*** -0.330***
(0.003) (0.046) (0.058)
UNSC candidate 0.013 0.261 0.446
(0.012) (0.217) (0.274)




N 8771 8771 8771
Log likelihood -1629.882 -1638.257
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† Covariates are expressed in logs
†† Correlation between εi and the observed characteristics is allowed
by assuming a relationship of the form: εi = xa+ αi,where αi ∼ iidN(0, σ2α).
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3: Panel estimation of troops contribution, UN missions
First Diﬀ Within First Diﬀ Within
Deaths† 0.039 -0.099 0.041 -0.090
(0.045) (0.157) (0.047) (0.157)
Conﬂict intensity 0.122* 0.117 0.123* 0.124
(0.068) (0.087) (0.067) (0.087)
Displaced† 0.139** 0.055 0.140** 0.095
(0.061) (0.088) (0.061) (0.087)
Sustainability -0.040 -0.032 -0.038 -0.048
(0.036) (0.049) (0.037) (0.051)
Mil Exp per capita† 0.262* 0.359 1.017*** 0.964***
(0.137) (0.252) (0.054) (0.067)
No in Armed Forces† 0.203 0.371
(0.142) (0.261)
FDI inﬂows† -0.012 0.061 -0.012 0.052
(0.033) (0.041) (0.033) (0.043)
Trade openness† -0.462** -1.412*** -0.432** -1.341***
(0.205) (0.407) (0.207) (0.410)
UNSCpoten -0.090 0.055 -0.085 0.050
(0.099) (0.182) (0.100) (0.181)
constant -0.037 5.329* -0.058** 0.154
(0.027) (2.873) (0.028) (2.225)
N 1165 1623 1165 1623
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
† Covariates are expressed in logs
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the number of troops deployed
The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the number of troops deployed
as a percentage of number in armed forces
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4: Panel estimation of troops contribution, NON-UN missions
First Diﬀ Within First Diﬀ Within
Deaths† -0.005 -0.010 -0.000 -0.005
(0.013) (0.033) (0.014) (0.035)
Conﬂict intensity 0.346*** 0.705*** 0.361*** 0.663***
(0.090) (0.119) (0.088) (0.132)
Displaced† -0.129*** -0.423*** -0.153*** -0.444***
(0.041) (0.083) (0.042) (0.087)
Sustainability -0.012 -0.044* -0.019 -0.052*
(0.019) (0.026) (0.019) (0.027)
Mil Exp per capita† 0.072 0.020 0.999*** 0.854***
(0.181) (0.133) (0.028) (0.052)
No in Armed Forces† 0.049 0.055
(0.179) (0.138)
FDI inﬂows† -0.135*** -0.188*** -0.144*** -0.240***
(0.030) (0.038) (0.031) (0.042)
Trade openness† -0.035 0.068 0.030 0.159
(0.104) (0.203) (0.107) (0.224)
constant 0.029 8.036*** -0.007 1.343
(0.018) (1.627) (0.017) (1.298)
N 1105 1469 1105 1469
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
† Covariates are expressed in logs
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the number of troops deployed
The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the number of troops deployed
as a percentage of number in armed forces
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 5: Panel estimation of troops contribution, NATO-led and EU missions
First Diﬀ Within First Diﬀ Within
Deaths† 0.017 0.034 0.022 0.043
(0.019) (0.053) (0.019) (0.053)
Conﬂict intensity 0.519*** 1.036*** 0.508*** 1.018***
(0.117) (0.143) (0.118) (0.143)
Displaced† -0.050 -0.411*** -0.055 -0.394***
(0.051) (0.087) (0.052) (0.092)
Sustainability 0.024 0.046 0.025 0.047
(0.018) (0.042) (0.018) (0.043)
Mil Exp per capita† -0.007 0.135 1.000*** 0.887***
(0.146) (0.153) (0.025) (0.051)
No in Armed Forces† -0.025 0.176
(0.147) (0.157)
FDI inﬂows† -0.195*** -0.339*** -0.204*** -0.376***
(0.038) (0.053) (0.039) (0.053)
Trade openness† -0.125 -1.033*** -0.137 -1.041***
(0.189) (0.233) (0.195) (0.239)
constant 0.057*** 11.370*** 0.028 5.141***
(0.019) (1.916) (0.019) (1.608)
N 817 1089 817 1089
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
† Covariates are expressed in logs
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the number of troops deployed
The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the number of troops deployed
as a percentage of number in armed forces
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 6: Panel estimation of troops contribution, NATO-led missions
First Diﬀ Within First Diﬀ Within
Deaths† 0.016 0.042 0.021 0.051
(0.020) (0.052) (0.020) (0.051)
Conﬂict intensity 0.461*** 0.943*** 0.452*** 0.923***
(0.118) (0.142) (0.119) (0.141)
Displaced† 0.004 -0.537*** -0.006 -0.534***
(0.039) (0.085) (0.039) (0.093)
Sustainability 0.004 0.114*** 0.005 0.116**
(0.014) (0.043) (0.015) (0.045)
Mil Exp per capita† -0.041 0.119 0.984*** 0.881***
(0.118) (0.148) (0.023) (0.055)
No in Armed Forces† -0.045 0.154
(0.119) (0.154)
FDI inﬂows† -0.118*** -0.331*** -0.127*** -0.371***
(0.028) (0.055) (0.029) (0.055)
Trade openness† -0.047 -0.953*** -0.052 -0.941***
(0.179) (0.211) (0.184) (0.218)
constant 0.097*** 12.958*** 0.064*** 6.665***
(0.020) (1.882) (0.020) (1.606)
N 637 811 637 811
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
† Covariates are expressed in logs
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the number of troops deployed
The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the number of troops deployed
as a percentage of number in armed forces
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7: Panel estimation of troops contribution, EU missions
First Diﬀ Within First Diﬀ Within
Deaths† 0.032 0.069 0.031 0.070
(0.059) (0.109) (0.074) (0.107)
Conﬂict intensity - - - -
(-) (-) (-) (-)
Displaced† -0.179 -0.053 -0.107 -0.062
(0.290) (0.247) (0.259) (0.230)
Sustainability -0.003 -0.197** -0.008 -0.197**
(0.064) (0.091) (0.067) (0.091)
Mil Exp per capita† -0.053 0.894 1.091*** 0.773***
(0.909) (0.939) (0.100) (0.154)
No in Armed Forces† -0.149 1.126
(0.890) (0.977)
FDI inﬂows† -0.687*** -0.713*** -0.725*** -0.707***
(0.199) (0.195) (0.184) (0.177)
Trade openness† -2.849 -3.442* -2.815 -3.439*
(1.829) (1.812) (1.862) (1.801)
constant -0.019 16.271* -0.024 17.336**
(0.023) (9.532) (0.027) (7.480)
N 180 278 180 278
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
† Covariates are expressed in logs
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the number of troops deployed
The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the number of troops deployed
as a percentage of number in armed forces
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Supply-Side Peacekeeping: Theories and New Evidence from a Panel Data Analysis 42
Table 8: Panel estimation of troops contribution, AU, CEEAC, Ad-hoc, CIS missions
First Diﬀ Within First Diﬀ Within
Deaths† 0.026** 0.036* 0.030** 0.042
(0.012) (0.021) (0.013) (0.026)
Conﬂict intensity 0.073 0.035 0.101 -0.088
(0.095) (0.063) (0.098) (0.104)
Displaced† -0.186** -0.204** -0.197** -0.151
(0.093) (0.097) (0.095) (0.111)
Sustainability -0.004 0.000 -0.018 -0.048
(0.030) (0.035) (0.031) (0.037)
Mil Exp per capita† 0.210 0.162 1.029*** 0.910***
(0.360) (0.169) (0.072) (0.083)
No in Armed Forces† 0.144 0.086
(0.354) (0.183)
FDI inﬂows† 0.006 -0.144*** 0.001 -0.268***
(0.041) (0.048) (0.042) (0.059)
Trade openness† -0.135 0.664** -0.046 1.081***
(0.177) (0.271) (0.185) (0.303)
constant -0.056 4.625** -0.103*** -2.754**
(0.038) (1.896) (0.034) (1.380)
N 296 390 296 390
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
† Covariates are expressed in logs
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the number of troops deployed
The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the number of troops deployed
as a percentage of number in armed forces
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
